Perils of dominance : imbalance of power and the road to war in Vietnam
Presents evidence that US policy decisions on Vietnam from 1954 to mid-1965 were shaped by an overwhelming imbalance of military power favoring the United States over the Soviet Union and China. This book demonstrates how the slide into war in Vietnam is relevant to understanding why the United States went to war in Iraq.
Print Book, English, 2005
University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif, 2005
XVIII, 403 Seiten 24 cm
Preface 1. The Imbalance of Power, 1953-1965 2. The Communist Powers Appease the United States 3. Eisenhower and Dulles Exploit U.S. Dominance in Vietnam 4. North Vietnamese Policy under the American Threat 5. Kennedy's Struggle with the National Security Bureaucracy 6. Johnson, McNamara, and the Tonkin Gulf Episode 7. Bureaucratic Pressures and Decisions for War 8. Dominoes, Bandwagons, and the Road to War 9. Conclusion: The Perils of Dominance Notes Select Bibliography Index
Literaturverz. S. 361 - 381