Front cover image for Governing the Commons : the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Governing the Commons : the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

This study examines the conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved
eBook, English, 1990
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
Case studies
1 online resource (300 pages)
9781139640930, 9780511807763, 1139640933, 0511807767
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Series editors' preface; Preface; Chapter1 Reflections on the Commons; Three influentialmodels; The tragedy of the commons; The prisoner's dilemma game; The logic of collective action; The metaphorical useof models; Currentpolicy prescripitons; Leviathan as the ""only"" way; Privatization as the ""only"" way; The ""only"" way?; An alternative solution; An empirical alternative; Policy prescriptions as metaphors; Policies based on metaphors can be harmful; A Challenge. Chapter 2 An Institutional Approach to the Study of Self-Organization and Aelf-Governance in CPRSituationsThe CPRsituation; CPRs and resource units; Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations; Interdependence, independent action, and collectiveaction; The theory of the firm; The theory of the state; Three puzzles: supply, commitment, andmonitoring; The problem of supply; The problem of credible commitment; The problem of mutual monitoring; Framinginquiry; Appropriation and provision problems; Multiple levels of analysis; Studying institutions in fieldsetings. Chapter 3 Analyzing Long-Enduring, Self-Organized, and Self-GovernedCPRsCommunal tenure in high mountain meadowsand forests; Tarbel, Switzerland; Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan; Huerta irrigationinstitutions; Valencia; Murcia andOrihuela; Alicante; Zanjera irrigation communites in thephilippines; Similarities among enduring, self-governingCPR institutions; Clearlydefined boundaries; Congruence between appropriation and provision rules andlocal conditions; Collective-choice arrangements; Monitoring; Graduated sanctions; Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Minimal recognition of rights to organizeNested enterprises; Chapter 4 AnalyzingInstitutional Change; The competitive pumping race; The setting; The logic of the water-rights game; The litigation game; The Raymond Basin negotiations; The West Basin negotiations; The Central Basin litigation; Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements; The entrepreneurship game; Reasons for forming a district to include both basins; Reasons against forming a district to include both basins; The polycentric public-enterprise game; The analysis of institutional supply. Incremental, sequential, and self-transforming institutional change in a facilitative political regimeReformulating the analysis of institutional change; Chapter 5 Analyzing Institutional Failures andFragilities; Two Turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems; California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems; A Sri Lankan fishery; Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka; The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries; Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study; Chapter 6 A Framework for Analysis of Self-Organizing and Self-GoverningCPRs
The problems of supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring