Russian-Speaking Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria
Together, Russia and the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia have seen more of their citizens and residents travel to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters than have any other parts of the world. Although numbers vary from source to source, roughly 8,500 individuals from these six countries1 havetraveled to join a host of Salafi-jihadi factions--most predominantly theIslamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).2 Among these individuals are manymilitants from Russia's north Caucasus, some of whom bring with them experiencein asymmetric and insurgent warfare learned from their involvement in the firstand second Chechen wars of independence and the insurgency that has torn apartthe North Caucasus region since those wars. These battle-hardened and competentfighters serve important roles within ISIS and Al Qaeda as bombmakers, propagandists, and field commanders. They are joined by Russian speakers whoquickly build that experience in combat in Syria, sometimes in groups dominatedby North Caucasian and Central Asian leaders and members. Having carried outroughly 30 interviews, supplemented by a review of the existing literature, CSIS identified the following key takeaways:The recent history ofstate-sponsored repression of Muslims in Central Asia left a small but possiblysignificant number of individuals susceptible to radicalization, includingrecruitment by ISIS and Al Qaeda (AQ); Some Central Asian migrants living inRussia have also proven susceptible to radicalization, and have gone on tofight in Syria; From 2011-2016, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) andlocal officials facilitated the movement of highly radicalized Russian-speakingforeign fighters from the North Caucasus to Turkey, and eventually Syria; LargeRussian-speaking diaspora communities in Turkey have both facilitated movementfor fighters to the battlefield and discouraged individuals from joining thefight against Bashar Assad; In the early years of the Syrian civil war, Turkishintelligence services facilitated the movement of Russian-speaking foreignfighters, from both preexisting radicalized diaspora populations and newimmigrant pools, to Syria to use them as a pro-Sunni fighting force capable ofremoving Assad; As a result of domestic terror attacks and increasinginternational pressure, Turkey has transitioned toward a policy of detainingand facilitating the unofficial "deportation" of Russian-speaking foreignfighters (and Russian speakers suspected of radical ties and interests). Manyhave left for Ukraine, not Russia, and the movement to new countries, such asEgypt, is on the rise; Foreign fighters from the North Caucasus have played anoutsized role on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, serving in leadershippositions for both ISIS and AQ. Out of the estimated 8,500 individuals who havetraveled from Russia and Central Asia to the battlespace, roughly 900 havereturned to their countries of origin.4 However, among the rest are an unknownnumber of Russian-speaking militants that have gained skills and credibility inthe battlespace, many of whom may seek refuge in large Russian-speakingdiasporas in Turkey's Istanbul, Ukraine, and across Europe. Some are alsofinding themselves in Egypt, among other destinations. As the physicalcaliphate comes to an end, these countries must now address this securityconcern and prepare to deal with an outflow of individuals that can easilyblend into, influence, and potentially launch attacks from these communities
eBook, English, 2017
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, 2017