Soviet apprehensions about Sino-American relations, 1971-74
Examines Soviet fears of U.S.-Chinese collusion against the USSR, and then considers the merits of the kind of military and intelligence cooperation that Moscow alleges has already begun. Memories of the American 1949 aid to a Yugoslavia threatened with Soviet invasion could affect Soviet perceptions today. Peking has long feared a surprise attack and has called for Brezhnev's overthrow, likening him to Hitler. China might wish U.S. military ties (1) to improve its forces, (2) to give Moscow the impression that the Americans would help China resist attack, (3) to generate Soviet-American friction, or (4) simply as part of an ongoing program to acquire all available foreign technology. The most advantageous policy for the United States might be to permit private export licenses for sales to China of defensive or passive military items, such as reconnaissance systems and over-the-horizon radar, which would be stabilizing rather than destabilizing. In addition, a Sino-American "hot line" would allow timely, imaginative crisis diplomacy to damp down Sino-Soviet hostilities. (Presented at the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama, in September 1974.)
Print Book, English, 1975
Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif., 1975