CIA and the Vietnam policymakers : three episodes 1962-1968
"This study examines three episodes between 1962 and 1968 when US policymakers faced critical points in the evolution of US involvement in Vietnam. During that period, CIA assessments and senior Agency personalities had at least the potential for significantly affecting policy decisions taken by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This study, based on recently declassified materials, examines the information and judgments CIA provided senior decisionmakers, assesses the impact these inputs had or did not have on policy decisions, and reflects on why the policy and intelligence outcomes developed as they did. For some years, CIA's assessments found little receptivity among policy-makers. Also, the quality of the Agency's intelligence was mixed and occasionally poor. Yet in most cases, as former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and numerous historians have since told us, CIA's pessimistic judgments on Vietnam proved prescient much of the time and, for the most part, were more accurate than those of other official contributors." --Back cover
Print Book, English, 1998
History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, [Langley, Va.], 1998