Helmuth von Moltke and the German General Staff : military and political decision-making in Imperial Germany, 1906-1916
This thesis explores the role and influence of Helmuth von Moltke, Germany's Chief of the General Staff in the years 1906-1914, and also the time from his dismissal In September 1914 until his death in June 1916. Based largely on primary evidence that was stored for decades in the archives of the Soviet Union and that has only recently become available, it re-evaluates the common interpretation of Moltke as an ineffectual and reluctant military leader whose influence was negligible and whose role can justifiably be marginalised, and argues instead that Moltke's influence in the prewar years was decisive in preparing the ground for the events that led to war in 1914. In the first part of the thesis, the role of the General Staff in military decision-making is explored, and the genesis of the Schlieffen Plan is charted as essential background to understanding Moltke's work. An examination of the controversies surrounding his appointment demonstrates that Moltke was much more ambitious than is usually claimed. The second part examines the reactions of Moltke and his colleagues to the many prewar crises and the strategic changes they made in the years 1908- 1914. Accounts of contemporaries serve to elucidate Moltke's relationships with his subordinates and his Austrian counterpart Conrad von HOtzendorf. Finally, the thesis concentrates on the July Crisis and the outbreak of war, as well as Moltke's failure as a wartime leader. This thesis demonstrates that Moltke was one of Germany's foremost warmongers and that he bore a significant share of the responsibility for the outbreak of war. During his time in office, important decisions were made in the General Staff which drastically reduced Germany's strategic options. As a result, Germany had no choice but to be the aggressor in a future war, regardless of diplomatic circumstances. In July 1914, the restrictions that this military planning posed on political decision-making became only too apparent
Thesis, Dissertation, English, 1997
1997